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Abstract Conventional modern just war theory is fundamentally incoherent. On the
one hand, the theory contains a theory of public war wherein ethical responsibility for
the justice of war belongs uniquely to political sovereigns while subjects, including
soldiers, are obligated to serve in war upon the sovereign’s command. On the other
hand, the theory contains a theory of discrimination which presupposes that partici-
pants in war, including soldiers, are responsible for the justice of the wars they fight.
Moreover, these two components are derived from two inconsistent visions of political
justice. The theory of public war, it turns out, is derived from a theory of justice that
places the value of political society conceived of as a supra-individual communal entity
above the value of the private individual. The theory of discrimination, however, is
derived from a theory of justice that places the value of the private individual above that
of political society. This inconsistency is revealed by analyzing the theories of Vitoria,
Grotius, and Walzer. Appreciating this problem also helps situate the recent revisionist
critiques of conventional just war theory.
Keywords Public war . Discrimination . Vitoria . Grotius . Walzer . Revisionist
just war theory
Michael Walzer (2006 [1977]) describes his just war theory as Bdualist^ (21). For him,
the two basic categories of just war theory—the theory of jus ad bellum, justice of the
resort to war, and the theory of jus in bello, justice of the conduct of war—are logically
independent. There is no necessary connection between the justice of a war from the
perspective of one category and its justice from the perspective of the other. An unjust
war can be fought justly and vice versa.
Shortly after introducing the dualism of jus ad bellum/jus in bello, Walzer explains
that it is derived from another, more fundamental, dualism (34–41). This deeper
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dualism is a division of moral responsibility for the justice of war within political
communities. For Walzer, the set of agents responsible for jus ad bellum is distinct from
the set responsible for jus in bello. On his account, political leaders are uniquely
responsible for waging war in accordance with jus ad bellum while the subordinates
of these leaders, including soldiers, are obligated to obey their leader’s commands. At
the same time, political leaders and their soldiers are each responsible for waging war in
accordance with jus in bello. In other words, only political leaders are bound by jus ad
bellum while political leaders and soldiers are bound by jus in bello (see 38–9).
Walzer thus describes soldiers as occupants of two distinctmoral roles in war.Walzer’s
view is that with respect to jus ad bellum soldiers are moral servants of their political
leaders in that they are obligated to follow their leader’s commands. When under orders,
soldiers may justifiably obey commands that violate jus ad bellum requirements. At the
same time, Walzer holds that soldiers are obligated to ensure that they never violate jus in
bello requirements even when ordered to by their political leaders. In the conduct of war,
soldiers may not justifiably obey commands contrary to justice. Thus, for Walzer, with
respect to jus ad bellum soldiers are obligated to obey commands and with respect to jus
in bello soldiers are not obligated to obey commands.1
An analysis of this dualism of responsibility and its history reveals something very
disturbing about conventional modern just war theory: It is fundamentally incoherent. I
hope to show that this dualism is based on two inconsistent components of just war
theory that have simultaneously been defended by theorists throughout the modern
period. On the one hand, there is a theory of public war wherein ethical responsibility
for the justice of war belongs uniquely to political sovereigns while subjects, especially
soldiers, are obligated to serve in war upon the sovereign’s command. On the other
hand there is a theory of discrimination wherein it is impermissible to target noncom-
batants while waging a just war yet it is permissible to target combatants. Though there
is disagreement among theorists as to why combatants are to be treated differently than
noncombatants, they are all committed to the view that soldiers are responsible for the
justice of the wars they fight. These two components of just war theory are inconsistent
in that they attribute to soldiers two conflicting moral roles in war. According to the
theory of public war, soldiers are not responsible for the justice of the wars they fight.
According to the theory of discrimination, soldiers are responsible for the justice of the
wars they fight.
Understanding this conflict and its origins reveals the fundamental incoherence of
modern just war theory. The theory of public war, it turns out, is derived from a theory
of justice that places the value of political society conceived of as a supra-individual
communal entity above the value of the private individual. Here, the soldier is
conceived of as an ontological part of the political community. The theory of discrim-
ination, however, is derived from a theory of justice that places the value of the private
individual above that of political society. Here, combatants, including soldiers, are
conceived of as ontologically independent beings. Modern systematic just war theory is
thus based on two, inconsistent theories of justice and social ontologies—one strongly
communitarian, the other individualist. In this way, modern systematic just war theory
is dualist all the way down.
1 On this general dualism of responsibility, see also Walzer (2004).
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Some commentators have noted a similar conflict within just war thought generally.
David Rodin (2002), for instance, points out that the just war has been understood as
either a relation between irreducibly social bodies or as a relation between individuals.
Taking these options as logical possibilities, Rodin examines both alternatives, finding
inadequacies in each. On my reading, the different frameworks do not just compete
within the logical space of just war thought generally but in fact compete within the
particular systematic theories of a number of seminal just war theorists in the modern
period. Indeed, the two views manifest themselves at similar points in the work of each
of these theorists. This suggests that the dualism of modern just war theory is a product
of the particular presumptions and aims of modern theorists.2
Unlike Rodin, this paper does not seek to criticize or defend the alternative norma-
tive and ontological frameworks. Rather, I aim merely to pinpoint the origins of these
competing frameworks, thereby explaining the confusion and enabling us to better
understand our current situation in order to make wiser philosophical choices. In
particular, understanding the dualism of modern just war theory sheds new light on
the nature and significance of recent revisionist theories of just war.
The paper is divided into three parts. The first part analyses the theories of Francisco
Vitoria, Hugo Grotius, and Walzer to reveal the inconsistencies between their theories
of public war and theories of discrimination. The second part analyzes the origins of the
inconsistencies in the same theories to reveal inconsistent foundational commitments
regarding the nature of justice and the individual/community relation. The third part
attempts to explain this dualism of modern just war theory.3
1 The Dualism of Public War and Discrimination
A dualism of responsibility similar to Walzer’s has pervaded just war theory throughout
the modern period. Although its earlier incarnations were never explicitly acknowl-
edged let alone purported to be coherent, political subjects, especially soldiers, have
been understood to have two distinct sets of moral responsibilities in war. On the one
hand, soldiers are the instruments of their political communities who are obligated to
serve in war upon command provided the war is not patently unjust. On the other hand,
soldiers are never obligated to serve in war upon command and are responsible for the
justice of any war they participate in.
1.1 Vitoria
I trace this dualism as far back as the early sixteenth century work of Francisco Vitoria.
Vitoria argues that typical subjects are not morally required to examine the reasons
2 Stephen Neff (2005: 111-3) also finds a dualism in modern just war theory. For him, the theory is dualist in
that it has commitments to rules that are based on natural law and rules that are based on the voluntary law of
nations. Modern just war theory juggles both, sometimes prioritizing natural law, sometimes prioritizing the
law of nations. Though I sense an interesting relation between this dualism and my topic, a discussion of it is
beyond the scope of this paper.
3 I should note that Vitoria, Grotius, andWalzer are not the only theorists to exhibit this dualism. I would argue
that the views of Francisco Suarez (2015 [1621]) are also an example.
Philosophia (2017) 45:751–771 753
Author's personal copy
behind the sovereign’s decision to wage and declare war. Concern with such matters is
simply not part of the subject’s civic responsibility. Rather, this responsibility is solely
the sovereign’s as well as anyone the sovereign asks for assistance in examining the
matter. Aside from other high ranking officials and those who counsel the sovereign,
Blesser subjects who are not invited to be heard in the councils of the prince nor in
public council are not required to examine the causes of war, but may lawfully go to
war trusting the judgment of their superiors^ (1991: 308).
This division of responsibility between the sovereign and the subject over the
decision to wage war means that the subject’s moral duties in war are not relative only
to the justice of the war itself, but are relative primarily to the commands of his
sovereign. The subject’s overriding duty is to obey orders to serve in wars declared
by his legitimate prince. Such orders bind a subject independent of the justice of the
war he is being ordered to participate in. The subject’s primary moral concern should
not be with the justice of the war he is asked to participate in but with the legitimacy of
the authority from which the order to participate is issued.
In cases where a subject has reason to doubt the justice of his sovereign’s war, he is
still obligated to serve because obedience to legitimate authority is an independent
moral duty. To think otherwise is to assume that, BIf I am in doubt whether the prince’s
war is just or whether the cause of a particular war is just, it follows immediately that I
must doubt whether or not I may lawfully fight.^ But, Vitoria argues,
I admit that it is never lawful to act against a conscientious doubt, so that if I am
in doubt whether I should act or not it is a sin to act. But it is incorrect to deduce
that if I am in doubt as to whether the cause of war is just, I must therefore doubt
whether I may lawfully make war, or fight in that war. In fact, we must deduce
just the opposite: if I am in doubt about the justice of war, it follows that it is
lawful for me to go to war at the command of my prince. In the same way, if an
officer of the law is in doubt whether the judge’s sentence is just, it is quite invalid
to conclude that he must doubt whether he may lawfully carry out that sentence;
on the contrary, indeed, he knows very well that he is required to carry out the
sentence of his superior. (312)
This is not to say that for Vitoria subjects are always obligated to obey commands by
their legitimate sovereign to serve in war. In cases where the subject finds the
sovereign’s war to be patently unjust, that is, when the war is unjustified on its face,
subjects are not only permitted to not serve but are obligated not to (307–8). For
Vitoria, to participate in a war that one is convinced is unjust is to act in bad faith and is
always wrong.
But, again, if there is any doubt as to whether a war is just or not, subjects remain
obligated to serve when ordered to by their legitimate authorities (312). This, coupled
with Vitoria’s insistence that subjects are not required to examine the justification of a
war they are ordered to participate in and that sovereigns ought not to explain and
justify their wars to the public (308), means that most participants in wars waged and
declared by legitimate authorities are not merely innocent. In fact, they are doing what
is morally required of them. In these cases, anything less than obedience would be
wrong. Only in cases where a war is patently unjust do subjects who participate have
anything to account for. In all other cases, subjects are acting in accordance with their
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duties. The injustice of a war, therefore, does not necessarily taint its participants in any
way.
At the same time as Vitoria asserts this view of the responsibilities of soldiers, he
also maintains that soldiers are always responsible for the justice of the wars they fight.
For Vitoria, a soldier fighting in an unjust war is not innocent of the injustice of the war
even if he was ordered to fight by his legitimate political sovereign and the order was
not patently unjust.
This alternative view of the responsibilities of soldiers is implicit in Vitoria’s theory
of discrimination. Vitoria argues that it is permissible to deliberately kill soldiers in war
yet impermissible to deliberately kill noncombatants. He claims that in the course of a
just war, it is permissible to indiscriminately kill the combatants on the opposing side
(319) and to execute those combatants even after the war is over (320). However, he
maintains that noncombatants ought never to be deliberately killed (314–5).4
Crucially, Vitoria argues that what makes it impermissible to deliberately kill
noncombatants is that they are innocent, whereas what makes it permissible to
deliberately kill combatants, including soldiers, in an unjust war is that they are not
innocent. For Vitoria, it is always wrong to deliberately kill the innocent (314–5).
Vitoria is not here employing an idiosyncratic view of Binnocence^ but is using it to
mean, roughly, not morally responsible.5 The non-innocent in war are those who
have done wrong by participating in an unjust war. Vitoria clearly distinguishes the
innocent and the non-innocent in war on moral grounds, referring to the non-
innocent as Bwicked.^ Moreover, Vitoria takes his principle of discrimination to
apply to both just defensive and punitive wars. For Vitoria, just as it would be
wrong to punish a person for a crime he is not responsible for, so too would it be
wrong to defend oneself by deliberately injuring a person who is not morally
responsible for the threat one is attempting to thwart (282–3).
But if soldiers are not innocent of the injustice of a war even when they are
following the orders of their legitimate political sovereign, then it must be Vitoria’s
view that soldiers are responsible for the justice of the wars they fight and they are
obligated to not participate in unjust wars regardless of the commands of their
sovereign. The moral distinction between soldiers fighting in an unjust war and
noncombatants is based on the view that soldiers are responsible for their partici-
pation in war. For Vitoria, if a soldier serves in an unjust war, even when under
orders to do so, he is personally acting unjustly and thereby becomes a legitimate
target of deliberate violence.
In this way, Vitoria has two views of the distribution of responsibility for the justice
of war at work in his theory. On one hand, soldiers are not responsible for the justice of
war and are obligated to serve in war upon the command of their legitimate political
sovereign. On the other hand, soldiers are responsible for the justice of the wars they
participate in and serving in an unjust war makes them liable to deliberate attack. These
two views of combatant responsibilities are entailed by his theory of authority over war
and his theory of discrimination in war respectively.6
4 Still, Vitoria permits Bplundering^ and enslaving noncombatants (317–9).
5 Contrary to the contention of Johnson (1975: 196).
6 It is likely that this inconsistency is behind Vitoria’s ambiguous account of the Binvincibly ignorant^ soldier
in an unjust war as both justified in and excused for fighting (see 313).
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1.2 Grotius
Roughly a century after Vitoria, we can find the same conflicting accounts of the
responsibilities of soldiers in the work of Hugo Grotius. Grotius defends what he calls
Bpublic war.^ Public war is war that is waged by a public body under the legitimate
authority of a political sovereign. The participants in public war are soldiers who act as
moral instruments of their sovereign. Participants in public war are thus not private,
autonomous actors but moral servants of a political authority.
Grotius distinguishes between principals, assistants, and instruments in war (2005
[1625]). Principals, assistants, and instruments are each possible efficient causes of war.
However, the respective moral status of these efficient causes in war varies.
The principal is the interested party or parties that act with the authority to make war.
They are the interested party or parties who engage in war willingly and claim the
authority to do so without the approval of any higher authority. In a private war, those
who are not the interested party but come to the aid of a principal as private persons,
whether as kin, neighbors, fellow private citizens, benefactors, or allies, are not the
principal of the war but act as assistants. These assistants, as private agents in private
wars, are morally responsible for their decision to participate in war.
In public war, by contrast, the principal is the supreme civil power. It is the civil
power that is the interested party and who acts with full authority to engage in war. In a
public war, those who participate as subjects of their supreme civil power are instru-
ments, not assistants. The political subject in war acts as a member of a public body and
under the authority and direction of a political sovereign. Though subjects in war act by
their own will, their will, in this case, depends on the will of their sovereign whom sets
the subjects in motion with morally binding commands. As instruments of their civil
power, they act under the obligation to obey the commands of their sovereign in things
pertaining to war. As he says, BAs a Servant is in a Family, the same is a Subject in a
State, and is therefore the Instrument of the Sovereign…Nor can we doubt, but all
Subjects may naturally be employed in War…^ (386).
It is clear that, for Grotius, political subjects in war have the duty to obey the orders
of their political sovereign to participate in war despite the fact that doing so puts their
lives and limbs at stake. Grotius says clearly that in such cases subjects are morally
obligated to act in ways that are contrary to their basic private interests. He says
explicitly that it is a soldier’s duty to remain at his post even under the hazard of death
(357). And when the defense of a political society requires the use of a subject as a
soldier, it is wrong for the subject to simply Bquit the service of his country^ (555).
Moreover, Grotius consistently compares political subjects to slaves (1167). He says
that the civil power has Bthe greatest Power over its Members^ (552). The civil power
has the right to command subjects in order to cultivate their virtue, not merely to ensure
they avoid violating the rights of others (357 and 1135). And, in all this, the civil power
has the right to lie to subjects when it thinks the deception of subjects is necessary for
the common good (1218–20).
This all implies that, for Grotius, political subjects ordered into war by their political
sovereign are not morally responsible for the justice of the wars they participate in.
Subjects can participate in an unjust war yet be doing what they are obligated to do.
At the same time, however, Grotius defends a principle of discrimination in defen-
sive war that is based on the view that soldiers are responsible for the justice of their
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wars. Like Vitoria, Grotius defends a principle of discrimination that prohibits deliber-
ately attacking noncombatants and permits deliberately attacking combatants when one
is waging a just defensive war.7
The reason Grotius holds that combatants on the opposing side in a defensive
war may be deliberately attacked while noncombatants may not is that the combat-
ants are personally acting wrongly in the relevant way while noncombatants are not.
For Grotius, by taking up arms and joining in an unjust war, combatants act
wrongly. The injustice that their public body commits against others by engaging
in unjust aggression is something that they, as participants in that aggression, have
each personally committed. Though soldiers may be excused from blame, the
wrong that their public commits in an aggressive war is a wrong that is attributable,
at least in some measure, to all its combatants. This renders combatants in an unjust
war liable to deliberate attack. 8 However, noncombatants, in a public body that
commits aggression cannot have that wrong attributed to them. As noncombatants,
the aggression their community commits is not something they personally commit.
Unlike combatants, noncombatants have personally acted in accordance with nat-
ural right in the relevant respect and there can be no just cause for war against them.
Grotius argues repeatedly that subjects of legitimate political authorities ought not to
participate in unjust wars that their sovereign wages and orders them to participate in
(1176–9).9 Subjects should not obey their sovereign’s commands when there is doubt
about the justification of those commands. Subjects should only obey when their
sovereign’s war is certainly justified. Thus, for Grotius, any soldier who participates
in an unjust public war acts contrary to his moral duties. Any combatant in an unjust
public war is personally acting unjustly.
It is for this reason that Grotius explicitly denies the possibility of the moral
equality of combatants, that is, the possibility of soldiers on opposing sides of a
public war confronting each other as equally morally innocent (1175–6). Contrary
to Vitoria, who held that in a war between commonwealths, though both sides
cannot have just cause for war, the soldiers on both sides can share the same moral
status as equally obedient political subjects (1991: 321), Grotius says such a thing is
not possible. For Grotius, the soldiers on the side without just cause will always
have a different moral status than the soldiers on the side with just cause. This is
because soldiers should only participate in just wars and should refuse to participate
in unjust wars regardless of the commands of their sovereign. A soldier fighting in
an unjust public war is personally acting unjustly while a soldier fighting in a just
war is personally acting justly.
Thus, Grotius has two distinct views of the responsibilities of soldiers in war. On the
one hand, they are not responsible for the justice of the wars they participate in. On the
other, they are so responsible. These two views are found in his theory of public war
and his theory of discrimination respectively.
7 I speak here solely of Grotius’ theory of discrimination in just war for defense against injury. Grotius also
allows for war for the punishment of injury and the recovery of property. In these cases, what constitutes just
discrimination in war is different from what it is in defensive war.
8 For a similar reading of Grotius on this point, see Tadashi (1993).
9 A position that Bsurprised^ Emer Vattel (2008 [1758]: 588).
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1.3 Walzer10
Unlike Vitoria and Grotius, Walzer, as we have seen, acknowledges the dualist
character of his theory. For Walzer, the fact that soldiers are not responsible for the
justice of war and are responsible for the justice of war is not inconsistent. According to
him, soldiers’ responsibilities differ relative to the aspect of the justice of war in
question. In particular, soldiers are not responsible for jus ad bellum, whereas they
are responsible for jus in bello.
However, when we examine the basis of this dualism of responsibility, we find that it
relies on an inconsistency that is similar to that in Vitoria and Grotius. Walzer’s two
conceptions of the soldier’s responsibilities are derived from two inconsistent compo-
nents of his theory of war. Like Vitoria and Grotius, Walzer posits a theory of public
war wherein soldiers are obligated to obey their political leaders in war and a theory of
discrimination wherein soldiers are not obligated to obey their leaders.
Contrary to how many commentators have understood him (see Mapel (1998),
McMahan (1994 and 2009) and McPherson (2004)),11 Walzer argues that soldiers are
not responsible for the justice of the wars they participate in because soldiers are
obligated to serve in war upon command. This reading of Walzer is suggested by his
discussion of the obligations of Erwin Rommel in WWII. For Walzer, Rommel was not
responsible for the fact that the German war effort was unjust because of Bthe nature of
political obedience. Rommel was a servant, not a ruler, of the German state; he did not
choose the wars he fought but, like Prince Andrey, served his ‘Tsar and country’…[B]y
and large we don’t blame a soldier, even a general, who fights for his own government.
He is not the member of a robber band, a willful wrongdoer, but a loyal and obedient
subject and citizen^ (2006: 39).
Walzer describes war as Bmorally as well as physically coercive [my emphasis]^
from the perspective of soldiers (53). Soldiers are not only physically and epistemically
constrained by their governments. Provided there is a sufficient Bfit^ between their
government and people, soldiers are also morally bound to serve their governments in
war when ordered to. Soldiers, unlike mercenaries, have Ba legal obligation and
patriotic duty^ to serve in war upon command (28). When a soldier fights, BWe assume
that his commitment is to the safety of his country, that he fights only when it is
threatened, and that then he has to fight (he has been Bput to it^): it is his duty and not a
free choice^ (27). It is this feature of public war that Walzer refers to as Bthe tyranny of
war.^ As he says, we can understand aggression Bas the exercise of tyrannical power,
first over [the aggressor’s] own people and then, through the mediation of the opposing
state’s recruitment and conscription offices, over the people they have attacked^ (31).
BHence the peculiar horror of war: it is a social practice in which force is used by and
against men as loyal or constrained members of states and not as individuals who
choose their own enterprises and activities^ (30).
Walzer develops a theory of discrimination in war that, like Vitoria and Grotius,
permits deliberately attacking combatants but prohibits deliberately targeting
10 My reading of Walzer here is drawn from Parsons (2012).
11 Each of these authors fails to appreciate the centrality of the soldier’s duty of serve in war upon command to
Walzer’s theory. They interpret Walzer as holding that soldiers are merely excused from blame for participat-
ing in an unjust war.
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noncombatants. Walzer argues that what makes combatants legitimate targets is that
they are not innocent, while what makes noncombatants illegitimate targets is that they
are innocent. Unlike Vitoria and Grotius, however, Walzer here employs a notion of
Binnocence^ that is indifferent to the moral justifiability of or blameworthiness for the
individual’s actions in war. For Walzer, what makes a combatant in war not innocent
and thereby liable to deliberate attack is that the combatant has taken up arms and is,
rightly or wrongly, currently threatening others. It is irrelevant to the combatant’s status
as a legitimate target whether or not the war he or she wages is justifiable. Combatants
as such render themselves liable to attack. As Walzer says, Bsimply by fighting,
whatever their private hopes and intentions, [combatants] have lost their title to life
and liberty, and they have lost it even though, unlike aggressor states, they have
committed no crime^ (136).12
For this reason Walzer cannot be accused of developing a theory of public war and a
theory of discrimination that contradict each other in precisely the same way as do
Vitoria and Grotius. Contrary to Vitoria and Grotius, Walzer does not hold that soldiers
in an unjust war are liable to attack because they are responsible for the justice of the
war they fight. Still, Walzer’s theory of discrimination ultimately contradicts his theory
of public war on the issue of the responsibilities of soldiers.
As we noted at the start, for Walzer, responsibility for abiding by the principle of
discrimination belongs to soldiers as well as to their leaders. No one can permissibly
violate the duty not to deliberately kill a person who has not forfeited their right to life.
This holds even when one is ordered to engage in such killing by one’s legitimate
authority. The duty to not kill the innocent trumps all political obligations. This is why
states may not override the principle of discrimination even when it would aid the
progress of an otherwise just war and why soldiers are obligated to refuse to obey
orders that violate the principle of discrimination (40, 304–16).
Here we see Walzer’s assertion of two distributions of moral responsibility for the
justice of war. According to Walzer’s theory of public war, soldiers are obligated to
obey orders even when those orders are to do something that violates justice. According
to the theory of discrimination, soldiers are obligated to disobey orders that violate
justice. The two theories thus hold soldiers responsible for the justice of their wars and
not responsible for their wars.
It is tempting to try to reconcile these positions by reasserting Walzer’s dualism of jus
ad bellum/jus in bello. That is, we might think these distributions of responsibility are
consistent because they are distributions of two different things. Soldiers are not respon-
sible for jus ad bellum and are obligated to obey orders to participate in war whereas
soldiers are responsible for jus in bello and are obligated to disobey unjust orders in the
course of war. Admittedly, this is how Walzer sometimes presents his views.
But this won’t solve the problem. This is because, first, the dualism of jus ad bellum/
jus in bello is supposed to be derived from the dualism of soldier’s responsibilities. As
Walzer argues clearly in a number of places, the reason we can take jus ad bellum and
jus in bello to be logically independent is that there is a division of responsibility among
the members of political communities for jus ad bellum and jus in bello. An unjust war
12 For powerful critiques of this theory of discrimination, see McMahan (1994) and Rodin (2002).
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can be fought justly because political leaders and not soldiers are responsible for jus ad
bellum while political leaders and soldiers share responsibility for jus in bello.
This is the ultimate point of his discussion of the responsibilities of Erwin Rommel.
Walzer aims to explain how Rommel’s participation in the war could be praiseworthy
despite the clearly aggressive character of the German war effort. That is, he aims to
explain the logical independence of jus ad bellum/jus in bello. He explains:
We draw a line between the war itself, for which soldiers are not responsible, and
the conduct of war, for which they are responsible, at least within their own
sphere of activity…We draw [the line] by recognizing the nature of political
obedience. Rommel was a servant, not a ruler, of the German state; he did not
choose the war he fought but, like Prince Andrew, served his Btsar and
country’…[B]y and large we don’t blame a soldier, even a general, who fights
for his own government. He is not the member of a robber band, a willful
wrongdoer, but a loyal and obedient subject and citizen…We allow him to say
what an English soldier says in Shakespeare’s Henry V: BWe know enough if we
know we are the king’s men. Our obedience to the king wipes the crime of it out
of us.^ Not that his obedience can never be criminal: for when he violates the
rules of war, superior orders are no defense. The atrocities he commits are his
own; the war is not. [The war] is conceived, both in international law and in
ordinary moral judgment, as the king’s business—a matter of state policy, not of
individual volition, except when the individual is the king. (38-9)
Walzer reiterates the same point at the start of his discussion of the theory of jus in
bello at the beginning of Part Three of the book. He says, BIn our judgments of the
fighting [jus in bello], we abstract from all consideration of the justice of the cause. We
do this because the moral status of individual soldiers on both sides is very much the
same: they are led to fight by their loyalty to their own states and by their lawful
obedience^ (127). Because of this status of soldiers with respect to jus ad bellum, we
must judge wars with respect to jus in bello Bwithout reference to the justice of their
cause.^ That is to say, because of the division of responsibility for jus ad bellum and jus
in bello there is a logical independence of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Therefore, the
dualism of soldier’s responsibilities cannot then depend on the dualism of jus ad
bellum/jus in bello as the above suggestion would have it.
Moreover, despite his assertion of their logical independence, both jus ad bellum and
jus in bello are supposed to have the same basis in the individual rights to life and
liberty. According to Walzer’s account, what permits or prohibits war and discrete acts
of war are one and the same set of human rights (xxiii-xxiv, 53, 54, 108, 135).13 To
violate the principles of jus ad bellum is, most fundamentally, to violate the rights of
people to life and liberty. To violate the principles of jus in bello is, most fundamentally,
to violate the rights of people to life and liberty. Thus, for Walzer to say that soldiers are
not responsible for jus ad bellum and are responsible for jus in bello would seem to
commit him to the view that soldiers are not responsible for human rights violations
and are responsible for human rights violations. In other words, for Walzer, soldiers are
13 Walzer also reiterates this view of the basis of his just war theory in Spheres of Justice (1983: xv).
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obligated to obey commands that violate justice and soldiers are not obligated to obey
commands that violate justice. Ultimately, Walzer’s assertion of a logical distinction
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello lacks any coherent justification and is the
product of the fundamental incoherence of his thought examined below.
2 The Dualism of Modern Just War Theory
An examination of the origins of the conflict between public war and discrimination
exemplified in Vitoria, Grotius, and Walzer, reveals an even more disturbing problem
for this tradition. The theory of public war is based on the view that the preservation of
the rights of the political community is the supreme concern in war and that the
individual may be used and sacrificed for the sake of the community. This view relies
on the conception of the political community as a supra-individual body whose
members are its ontological parts. The theory of discrimination is based on the view
that the rights of private individuals are the supreme concern in war and individuals
may not be used and sacrificed for the sake of the community. This view relies on the
conception of the individual as ontologically independent of the community. In other
words, the theory of public war entails communitarian presumptions while the theory of
discrimination entails individualist presumptions. In this way, conventional modern just
war theory has dualist foundations.
The origins of the rights of public war can be found in pre-modern quasi-Aristotelian
Scholastic political theories that hold the good of the supra-individual political com-
munity is paramount and that the duties of individuals are to do what is constitutive of
or promotes the good of the community. 14 On this point of view, the political
community is, or is analogous to, a natural body and the individual is, or is analogous
to, its part, something that only exists and flourishes in its relation to the whole. When it
comes to soldiers, these theorists can thus conceive of them as essentially instruments
of the political community and its ruler, bound to obey commands to serve in war
largely independently of the justice of those commands and regardless of the personal
sacrifice service in war requires.
This approach is evident in Aquinas who endorses the Aristotelian view of the
commonwealth as analogous to a natural body, or a ‘perfect community,’ that is more
than the sum of its individual parts. This supra-individual body has interests that cannot
be reduced to the private interests of its parts. As he says, ‘[I]ndividual interests and the
common good are not the same. Individuals differ as to their private interests, but are
united with respect to the common good…’ (2002: 7). For Aquinas, the common good
can trump the private good.
Just as one man is part of a household, so a household is part of a State; and a
State is a perfect community, as is said at Politics I. And so just as the good of one
man is not the final end, but is subordinated to the common good, so too the good
14 Some commentators see classical just war theory as individualist in nature (see Neff (2005: 56-7) and
McMahan (2010a and 2010b)). For a rebuttal of these interpretations and a defense of the position taken here
see Parsons (2013).
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of one household is subordinated to the good of the whole State, which is a
perfect community. (82)
Aquinas holds that the authority to govern the parts of the commonwealth for the
sake of common good is naturally vested in a ruler. Obedience to this ruler is the virtue
of the subject and is good in itself (60). It is a soldier’s purpose in the commonwealth to
wage war when called upon by his legitimate king. Armies are raised by kings for the
purpose of protecting the commonwealth against attack upon command. In this respect,
soldiers qua soldiers are parts of the community that are to be used by the rulers for the
sake of the preservation of the communal whole. This is grounded in the natural order
of things.
For we observe that the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard the
whole; as, for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for
the whole body’s safety. And since reason imitates nature, we find the same
imitation among the political virtues; for it belongs to the virtuous citizen to
expose himself to the danger of death for the conservation of the whole body
politic... (1997: 563)
2.1 Vitoria
Vitoria is a thoroughgoing Thomist and this is evident in his just war theory. Like
Aquinas, Vitoria characterizes the commonwealth as a supra-individual entity. In On
the Law of War, shortly after asserting the right of the commonwealth to wage war, he
defines the commonwealth in Aristotelian terms as ‘a perfect community.’ A perfect
community, for him, is that in which ‘nothing is lacking’ and is ‘complete in itself’
(1991: 301)
Vitoria’s sermon On Civil Power expresses this view of the commonwealth even
more clearly. Relying heavily on Aristotle, he describes commonwealths and civil
power as natural to mankind (6–10). He describes the commonwealth as an ontological
whole which has rights that are foundationally distinct from the rights of private
individuals. For him, the supreme value of justice is the common good, not the private
good. Individuals are parts of the communal whole and may be used for the sake of the
whole. Thus, he argues, soldiers may be used and sacrificed for the sake of the
commonwealth. As he says,
[E]very man has the power and right of self-defense by natural law, since
nothing can be more natural than to repel force with force. Therefore the
commonwealth, in which ‘we, being many, are one body, and every one
member one of another’ as the Apostle says (Rom. 12:5), ought not to lack
the power and right which individual men assume or have over their bodies, to
command the single limbs for the convenience and use of the whole. Individ-
uals may even risk the loss of a limb if this is necessary to the safety of the rest
of the body; and there is no reason why the commonwealth should not have
the same power to compel and coerce its members as if they were its limbs for
the utility and safety of the common good. (11)
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This view of the commonwealth and justice underpins Vitoria’s theory of public
war and his view that soldiers are obligated to obey commands to serve in war and
are not obligated to ensure that the wars they participate in are just. The theory of
public war originates in this pre-modern quasi-Aristotelian theory of justice wherein
the interests of the supra-individual political community are prior to the interests of
the private individual.
Vitoria’s theory of discrimination must have a different basis. Recall, the theory of
discrimination is based on the view that soldiers are not obligated to obey orders by
their legitimate sovereign to participate in war. Rather, they are obligated to ensure that
they only participate in just wars and are responsible for the justice of the wars they
serve in. This puts them in a decidedly different moral position than does the theory of
public war.
Vitoria’s theory of discrimination does not clearly articulate the theory of justice
it is based upon. However, it is reasonable to read the theory as based on an
individualist theory of justice. In particular, the theory of discrimination appears
to be based on a theory of just violence between private individuals. It appears to be
an assertion of the private rights of self-defense that Vitoria embraces alongside the
public rights of commonwealths to defense and punishment. On this theory, all
individuals have the right to engage in violence and, in turn, the responsibility to
ensure that their exercise of this right is just. Here, everyone shares responsibility
for their violence and there is no entity with unique authority over war (299). When
one person unjustly violates another, the victim has the right to protect his rights
with violence directed against the attacker because the attacker has personally
committed an injustice. In this case, the attacker is not an instrument of a higher
authority but a private person with responsibility for his conduct.
But this theory conflicts with the theory of public war in that it posits a conflicting
vision of the duties of subjects in war. The theory of public war requires denying
subjects the private rights of self-defense. The Blimbs^ of the commonwealth cannot
have rights to preserve themselves that trump the rights of the commonwealth.
In this way Vitoria’s theory of just war juggles two inconsistent theories of
justice. On the one hand he defends a theory of public war by appeal to the
supremacy of the commonwealth as a supra-individual entity. On the other hand
he defends a theory of discrimination by appeal to the supremacy of the individual
and his rights of self-defense.
2.2 Grotius
Grotius’ dualism has a different ultimate origin. At times, the basis of Grotius’ theory of
public war appears very similar to Vitoria’s and the pre-modern theorists. He depicts the
public body as a supra-individual entity and the member of the body as its part to be
used for the sake of the whole. In his discussion of the nature of the principal-
instrument relation he links the possibility of such relations to an essential ontological
connection between the principal and the instrument.
By Instruments, we mean not Arms, nor such like Things; but certain Persons
who act by their own Will, but yet so as that their Will depends on another, that
sets it in Motion: Such is a Son to his Father, being part of himself naturally; or a
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Servant, as a Part of his Master by Law. For as a Part is not only a Part of the
Whole, in the same Relation as a Whole is the whole of a Part, but that very
Thing which it is, because of the Whole on which it depends: So the Thing
possessed makes in some Manner part of the Possessor…As a Servant is in a
Family, the same is a Subject in a State, and is therefore the Instrument of the
Sovereign.
Nor can we doubt, but all Subjects may naturally be employed in War…
(2005: 386)
But what makes Grotius fundamentally different from Vitoria and the classical
theorists is that this understanding of the public body and the sovereign-subject
relationship does not originate in nature. Rather, for Grotius the public body and the
duty of the member to serve the body as an instrument have their origin in the social
contract that founds the political community. Grotius is arguably the first systematic
moral and political philosopher in the modern period to abandon the Aristotelianism of
the pre-moderns and defend political obligations by appeal to a contract made out of
self-interest by rights-bearing private individuals in a state of nature.15 For Grotius, civil
right, or political justice, is not a component of natural right but a product of the
exercise of voluntary right (162).
According to Grotius, individuals have certain private rights by nature. Among these
is the authority to defend individuals from violations of their rights and the right to
punish violators of rights without permission from anyone else (184–5). Though
individuals have the right to engage in defensive or punitive violence it is their personal
responsibility to ensure that it is done justly. Thus, by nature there is only private war,
not public war.
Individuals find it more desirable to relinquish this private authority to enforce rights
than to keep it and voluntarily constitute a political body, giving the majority the unique
right to enforce justice on its members. This sovereign power of the political body also
has the right to command the members to participate in the violent enforcement of
justice. The purpose of the political association is to protect the individual rights that its
members have by nature (162, 184, 358). Grotius’ view, similar to subsequent early
modern social contract theorists, is that the only way to more effectively protect
individual rights than can be done in the state of nature is to create legitimate
institutions of public war wherein a sovereign power has the authority to decide when
violence is appropriate and the right to command others to the engage in that violence.
The institutions of public war allow the civil power to legitimately command the
members to serve in war regardless of the justice of the war and regardless of the
personal peril the war puts the member in. The soldier, for Grotius, no longer has the
natural right to use violence to enforce justice but is subject to the will of the sovereign.
This is what it means to be the instrument of a principal with the right to wage war.
But this defense of public war is not consistent. The rights individuals are supposed
to have by nature, including the right to engage in violence and, correlatively, the
15 Those who read Grotius in this way include Haakonssen (1985), Schneewind (1998), Tuck (1979 and
1999).
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responsibility for the just use of violence, cannot be alienated by contract. This is
especially true if the contract that is supposed to alienate those rights is entered into
specifically to protect those rights. Thus, on Grotius’ theory when the sovereign orders
a subject into war the subject should be responsible for ensuring that the war is just and
ought to refuse to participate in unjust wars. If a subject should participate in an unjust
war, even when following orders from his legitimate sovereign, he is acting unjustly.
In fact, as we have seen, Grotius repeatedly asserts precisely this view. For Grotius,
no one is permitted to violate natural right even those who have voluntarily submitted
to the authority of another. This is the view he relies on to support his theory of
discrimination. What makes it permissible to deliberately attack soldiers engaged in an
unjust war but not noncombatants is that the soldiers, by engaging in an unjust war, are
personally acting unjustly whereas noncombatants are not.
Grotius’ failure to coherently defend public war mirrors Hobbes’ failure to coherently
defend the rights of the sovereign. Hobbes argues that subjects give up the natural right
to do whatever is necessary to preserve themselves and are absolutely bound to obey the
sovereign (1994 [1651]: 110–8). Yet he argues that subjects always maintain the right to
disobey any order that threatens their lives (141–3). This inconsistency is a result of the
inability of his social contract to justify the alienation of the original rights of people. If
political society is not natural but merely voluntary, natural rights must always limit the
authority of the state.16 And since all people are said by Hobbes to have the natural right
to do what is necessary to preserve their lives, the sovereign cannot use them as mere
violent instruments. In Grotius’ case too, this is why people cannot alienate the natural
obligation to respect natural rights and become the instrument of the sovereign.
This explains Grotius’ dualism. Grotius defends his theory of public war with a
theory of justice that in fact undermines public war. As a result of this, Grotius’ theory
of public war asserts two inconsistent views of the obligations of soldiers in war.
According to Grotius’ theory of public war, soldiers are obligated to obey their
sovereign and not obligated to obey their sovereign; they are instruments of their
sovereign and not instruments of their sovereign. In defense of his theory of discrim-
ination, Grotius can find the philosophical material within his theory of public war to
appeal to views that contradict his theory of public war.17 Inevitably, he produces a
fundamentally incoherent theory.
2.3 Walzer
On its surface, Walzer’s dualism can appear to be a product of a contradiction similar to
Grotius’. Ultimately, however, Walzer’s failings are closer to Vitoria’s. Like both
Vitoria and Grotius, Walzer at times describes the political community as a supra-
individual body and the members as instruments of the body. Walzer describes war as
analogous to, not reducible to, a relation between individuals (2006: 58). As he says,
B[W]ar itself isn’t a relation between persons but between political entities and their
human instruments^ (36).
16 For a similar though much more developed exposition of this failure of Hobbes’ theory, see Hampton
(1986).
17 Others have found a similar incoherence to Grotius’ theory (see Tuck 1979: 79).
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Seen on one level, just wars for Walzer are based on the rights of political
communities, or what he sometimes calls, peoples or nations. A community has a right
to go to war when it is the victim of aggression. Aggression is defined as a violation of
the rights of a political community to political independence and territorial integrity. To
stop such rights violations it is worth sacrificing individual lives (53).
What makes political communities so valuable is their relation to what Walzer calls
the Bcommon life^ of a people (54–7). Walzer describes this common life as a set of
Bshared experiences and cooperative activity.^ The common life is the particular
cultural and political activities or norms that constitute a distinct political body. In this
sense, then, just wars are fought between irreducibly social political entities and these
entities are worth using individuals as violent instruments to protect.
However, like Grotius, Walzer claims that the rights of political communities are
based on the rights of private individuals (53). He argues that the rights of states are
derived from the private rights of their members through a social contract (54). This
contract grounds the rights of political communities in war, including the right to
conscript and sacrifice their members. In this way, the rights of political communities
are not natural as they are for Vitoria and the classical theorists, but are derived, through
contract, from the original rights of individuals to life and liberty. For Walzer, individ-
uals can be transformed into violent instruments who are obligated to serve in war upon
command regardless of the justice of the war through a social contract in a way that is
consistent with original individual rights to life and liberty.
Grotius failed to show how this could be so and I confess that I don’t think it is
possible. In any case, it is worth noting that Walzer also seems to think that it cannot be
done. In the only place in Just and Unjust Wars where Walzer speaks of the need to
demonstrate how the duty to serve in war upon command can be derived from the
rights of individuals to life and liberty he refers, in a footnote (54–5), to an earlier article
of his, BThe Obligation to Die for the State^ (1970). In this article Walzer describes the
sort of contract that he thinks could ground an obligation to die for the state. This
Bcontract^ turns out to require the creation of an essential connection between the
individual and the political community such that the community is not merely an
instrument for the protection of individual rights but is, rather, a supra-individual thing
that the individual is essentially a part of. This essential connection between the
individual and the community makes it the case that the destruction of the community
is also the destruction of the individual even in cases where the individual physically
survives the death of the community. For Walzer, prior to being obligated to die for the
state one must cease being a private individual and become an ontological part of the
state. Thus, when soldiers go to war, they act as, essentially, members of the political
community. As he says, BThey die willingly for the sake of the state, not because the
state protects their lives—which would be…absurd—but because the state is their
common life. So long as the state survives, something of the citizen lives on, even
after the natural man is dead^ (92).
In BThe Obligation to Die for the State,^ as in Just and Unjust Wars, the Bcontract^
that transforms individuals into members of the state is not a literal contract. It is
described simply as the transformation, over time, of a private individual into a member
of a common life. Indeed, in a later essay, Walzer (1998) denies that membership in a
political community and the obligation to fight on its behalf is voluntarily assumed at
all. Therefore, rather than being grounded in the private rights of individuals, the rights
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of public war appear to be grounded ultimately in the rights of political communities as
such. Though Walzer asserts that, historically speaking, people were once private
individuals with equal rights, his social Bcontract^ simply refers to the subsequent
transformation of people into members of political bodies. Thus, individuals do not
Btransfer^ their original, private rights to the state. Rather, modern individuals find
themselves, not as private, rights-bearing individuals, but as essentially political beings
bound to serve a given state.
But, as we’ve seen, Walzer’s theory of discrimination presupposes that the rights of
individuals trump the rights of political communities. If the theory of discrimination is
based on the rights of individuals, then it presupposes that the rights of individuals
trump the rights of communities, including the political obligations of soldiers to obey.
Rather than being obligated to obey orders regardless of their justice, according to the
theory of discrimination, soldiers are obligated to refuse to obey orders that violate
justice. According to the theory of discrimination, soldiers are responsible for the
justice of their actions and are not the instruments of political communities.
To ground this understanding of the responsibilities of the soldier, Walzer must
abandon the theory underpinning his jus ad bellum. Though at the level of jus ad
bellum, soldiers confront each other as instruments of their communities, bound to obey
their sovereign regardless of the justice of the war, Walzer describes the conduct of war,
i.e., combat between soldiers on opposing sides, very differently. He conceives of
combat as fundamentally and immediately a relation between equal, private individ-
uals. On the battlefield, there occurs a direct interaction between individual men and
women that is unmediated by any antecedent political obligations. In the conduct of
war, men and women confront each other simply as men and women, as mere
individual human beings with equal rights, not as obedient members of particular
communities bound to obey.
This picture of combat emerges when Walzer discusses five firsthand accounts of
combat experience wherein a combatant recounts a reluctance to attack an individual
enemy soldier. On Walzer’s interpretation, what underpins this reluctance to open fire
on the enemy in all cases is the recognition of a fellow, equal human being in the enemy
soldier. Walzer says that it is this understanding of combat that underpins his theory of
jus in bello (2006: 142).
Thus, Walzer’s dualism is derived from inconsistencies in the theory of justice
underpinning his theory of just war. Regarding jus ad bellum, Walzer holds that the
rights of communities are paramount and individuals are essentially connected to the
community. Regarding jus in bello, Walzer holds that the rights of individuals are
paramount and individuals are not essentially attached to the community. Thus, like
Vitoria, Walzer’s theory of public war is based on a communitarian theory of justice
and his theory of discrimination is based on an individualist theory of justice.
3 Explaining the Dualism
We have seen that these seminal attempts at systematically defending a theory of
just war share a similar failing. They each defend a theory of public war and a
theory of discrimination that contain two incompatible views of the responsibilities
of soldiers in war. According to the theory of public war, soldiers are not
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responsible for the justice of war. According to the theory of discrimination,
soldiers are responsible for the justice of war.
Further, we have found that this dualism of responsibility reveals a fundamental
incoherence in each of the theories. They are dualist all the way down. For Vitoria, the
theory of public war is based on a quasi-Aristotelian theory of justice that holds the
supra-individual political community is analogous to a natural body and its parts are
ethically bound to serve its interests. Vitoria’s theory of discrimination, however, treats
the soldier as a private individual whose basic ethical task is to respect his and others’
private rights.
For Grotius, the theory of public war is based on the idea of a social contract
between essentially private persons who voluntarily form a public body and submit to
the authority of a civil power who has the right to command them in war. But Grotius’
social contract cannot accomplish this and he (at times) admits that soldiers are not the
instruments of the civil power. Grotius’ theory of discrimination appeals to this
alternative understanding of the political obligations of subjects and denies that soldiers
are obligated to obey commands in war, saying instead that they are responsible for the
justice of the wars they participate in.
For Walzer, though he says that the theory of public war is based on a social contract
between rights-bearing individuals who forfeit their rights to the political community
and become its instrument, this is not the case. In fact, the basis of the soldier’s duty to
obey commands to serve in war is the ontological connection between the individual
and the community that the individual did not voluntarily create. Walzer’s theory of
discrimination however is based on a view of the soldier as a private rights-bearing
individual confronting other equal private rights-bearing individuals in combat.
How can we account for this structural deficiency in all three of these systematic just
war theories? On my view, the dualism of modern just war theory is the result of failed
attempts to overcome two philosophical challenges. The first is the apparent difficulty
of grounding a principle of discrimination that is consistent with a theory of public war
and acts as an independently binding side-constraint on public action in war. The
second is the challenge of grounding a theory of public war in a modern individualism.
Regarding the first problem, the theory of public war presupposes that the
political community is worth sacrificing individuals for. According to the theory
of public war, individuals, even innocent individuals, may legitimately be killed for
the sake of the rights of the community. On such theories, subjects are obligated to
serve in war upon command. Thus, in a war between two commonwealths the
soldiers who fight and die are often not personally committing any wrong even if
they are participating in an unjust war. Their deaths are justified not because of
anything they have done personally but because of the transcendent value of the
political community. But if just cause for war justifies deliberately killing innocent
people, then it is difficult to see why one should never deliberately kill noncom-
batants. According to the theory of public war, the innocence of noncombatants by
itself cannot be a side-constraint on the pursuit of justice in war. Just cause for war
could potentially justify unleashing any manner of violence on individuals, even
innocent individuals, that is necessary to achieve the just cause.
Importantly, this could explain why the classical just war theorists did not develop
theories of discrimination that acted as independent side constraints on public war. As
Stephen Neff (2005: 64-5) argues, though classical theorists developed theories of
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discrimination that permitted attacking soldiers but prohibited attacking civilians, they
based this distinction on necessity, not on a perceived intrinsic moral difference
between soldiers and civilians. These theorists thought that one should not deliberately
attack civilians because it was not necessary to achieve the just cause of the war. In
principle, then, if it should become necessary to achieve the just cause, deliberate
attacks on civilians would be permissible. For many, this is an unacceptably weak
theory of discrimination.
Vitoria is usually credited with being one of the first in the Western tradition to
attempt to ground a more robust theory of jus in bello, especially a principle of
discrimination, that binds political communities in war independently of the justice of
their cause thereby prohibiting deliberate attacks on civilians regardless of their military
utility (see Johnson 1975: 195–203). But as we’ve seen, he does not ground his theory
of discrimination in the same theory underpinning his theory of public war. Because he
takes non-innocence to be the mark of those potentially liable to deliberate attack and
views soldiers in an unjust war as non-innocents, he must contradict his theory of
public war by denying that subjects are obligated to obey orders to participate in war. In
denying that subjects are so obligated he seems to appeal to an individualist theory of
private self-defense. This explains Vitoria’s dualism. It reveals the challenges that
advocates of public war, such as Grotius and Walzer, face in articulating a strong
theory of discrimination.18
It should be noted that even if the theory of public war cannot be reconciled with a
strong theory of discrimination it does not follow that there cannot be a coherent
dualism of jus ad bellum/jus in bello as such. In principle, the theory of public war
could be reconciled with the dualism of jus ad bellum/jus in bello. For instance, a
political community could distribute responsibility for war in such a way that political
leaders are solely responsible for the resort to war whereas soldiers are obligated to
obey their leader’s commands. At the same time, this community could delegate
responsibility for the conduct of war to soldiers as well as their political leaders. This
would amount to a coherent dualism of jus ad bellum/jus in bello. This being said, the
point of this discussion has been to show that the content of the theory of jus in bello
posited by conventional just war theory, particularly the principle of discrimination,
contradicts the theory of public war. Vitoria, Grotius, and Walzer, while advocates of
the theory of public war, attempt to prohibit deliberate attacks on noncombatants by
appealing to positions that contradict their commitments regarding the responsibilities
of soldiers entailed by the theory of public war. It is this move that creates the
foundational dualism of modern just war theory, a dualism that in this case renders
the theory incoherent.
The second problem is inherited from Grotius’s individualist turn. The problem is
that the theory of public war cannot straightforwardly be grounded in an individualist
theory of justice. Grotius attempts to eschew the communitarian foundations of the
classical theorists and replace them with a theory that holds the rights of private
individuals are supreme. This project seems to successfully ground a theory of dis-
crimination similar to Vitoria’s. However, it fails to justify a theory of public war. The
18 It also explains the turn to the voluntary law of nations as an independent ground for jus in bello constraints
so clearly made by Vattel (2008 [1758]). This is where my dualism of just theory appears to connect with
Stephen Neff’s dualism mentioned above (see note 2).
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rights of individuals cannot be alienated to a political sovereign and all subjects must
retain the obligation to not violate the rights individuals have prior to all contracts.
Thus, Grotius cannot (and does not) consistently maintain that soldiers are obligated to
obey orders to participate in war. Grotius’ individualist turn thus undermines the theory
of public war.
It is the apparent conflict between individualism and public war that ultimately
explains Walzer’s dualism as well. Walzer claims that his theory has an individualist
basis. However, as we have seen, in order to justify public war, especially the duty of
soldiers to serve in war upon command, he abandons his individualism and relies
instead on a communitarian theory. But, like Vitoria, in order to ground a strong theory
of discrimination Walzer must contradict his theory of public war and appeal to the
rights of individuals instead. His just war theory thus relies on two inconsistent theories
of justice in a manner similar to Vitoria.
This is why the dualism of just war theory revealed here is best thought of as a
modern phenomenon. It is the product of a theory of just war with pre-modern origins
coming into conflict with early modern individualism. This conflict appears first in
attempts to ground a strong theory of discrimination alongside a traditional theory of
public war and then in attempts to give modern foundations to the theory of public war.
Along with highlighting the need for a fundamental rethinking of the foundations
of systematic just war theory, the story of the dualism of modern just war theory
helps us understand the full significance of some recent revisionary trends in just
war thought. Much of recent just war theory has accepted the individualism of
modern just war theory embodied in the theory of discrimination but has, perhaps
not entirely consciously, rejected the theory of public war (see Luban 1985;
McMahan 2009; Fabre 2012; Frowe 2014). From the perspective adopted here,
these recent theories can be understood as attempts to reduce just war theory to a
modern theory of discrimination exemplified in Vitoria, Grotius, and Walzer. In
effect, these recent theorists have chosen the discrimination strand of modern just
war theory over the public war strand. We should now be in a better position to
evaluate the merits and dangers of this revisionary trend.
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